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Abstract—Transportation Network Companies employ dy-
namic pricing methods at periods of peak travel to incentivise
driver participation and balance supply and demand for rides.
Surge pricing multipliers are commonly used and are applied
following demand and estimates of customer and driver trip
valuations. Combinatorial double auctions have been identified as
a suitable alternative, as they can achieve maximum social welfare
in the allocation by relying on customers and drivers stating
their valuations. A shortcoming of current models, however, is
that they fail to account for the effects of trip detours that
take place in shared trips and their impact on the accuracy of
pricing estimates. To resolve this, we formulate a new shared-ride
assignment and pricing algorithm using combinatorial double
auctions. We demonstrate that this model is reduced to a
maximum weighted independent set model, which is known to
be APX-hard. A fast local search heuristic is also presented,
which is capable of producing results that lie within 1% of the
exact approach. Our proposed algorithm could be used as a fast
and reliable assignment and pricing mechanism of ride-sharing
requests to vehicles during peak travel times.
Index Terms—Ride-Sharing, Combinatorial Double Auctions,
Assignment, Dynamic Pricing
I. INTRODUCTION
THE recent proliferation of Transportation Network Com-panies (TNCs) has been facilitated by an increasing
demand for efficient, economic and personalised modes of
urban mobility. TNCs have quickly captured significant share
of the urban mobility market, by providing a service that
is usually cheaper than taxis, more convenient than public
transport, and an effective alternative to private car ownership.
Their success has been underpinned by the use of powerful
algorithms and analytics, which helped reduce waiting times
and increase fleet utilisation [1], [2].
To maintain a balance between the supply and demand for
rides, TNCs frequently apply dynamic pricing measures [3]
usually taking the form of variable surge tariff multipliers.
Such measures can motivate drivers to attend under-served
areas, dampen demand by eliminating requests from riders that
are delaying their departure, and also incentivize shared rides
between customers or the use public transport (PT) [4].
Through these methods, TNCs effectively operate a two-
sided market, to the beneffit of both the drivers and the
riders. As many major TNCs consider to deploy Autonomous
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Vehicles (AVs) in the near future, their platforms are likely
to be transformed into one-sided markets, where they will
enjoy complete control of the supply [5]. Previous work by
Karamanis et al. [6] demonstrated that such platforms can
still incentivise the use of shared rides or PT transport while
remaining profitable.
Existing dynamic pricing methods suggest new equilibrium
prices to customers without having prior knowledge of their
trip valuations. If these are considered, market equilibrium
prices could be identified without approximation, therefore
transforming this process into an auction. Previous work on
dynamic pricing using auction theory [7]–[10] focused on
the interactions between riders (bidders) and drivers (sellers)
who are expected to declare their valuations and costs for
prospective rides.
A TNC platform, taking the role of the auctioneer, would be
responsible for determining the winner of each auction [10].
Possible auction settings might involve one or multiple drivers
that are assigned to customers sequentially or simultaneously.
Manipulations of the auctions by either side can be avoided
through the use of mechanism design theory, and the analysis
of participation incentives.
Combinatorial Double Auctions (CDAs) [11] can be used
to allocate multiple drivers to riders simultaneously and effi-
ciently1 using linear programs that are commonly referred to as
winner determination problems (WDP) [8], which are known
to be NP-hard. WDPs can be formulated as set packing prob-
lems that maximise the auctioneer’s revenue (or social welfare)
while taking into account the utilities of the participants [12].
Research in dynamic ride-sharing (DRS) (carpooling), is
particularly relevant, with several studies exploring the ap-
plicability of auction models between commuting drivers
and riders [7], [13], [14]. In [7], the authors propose a
CDA discounted trade reduction mechanism for DRS as-
signment and pricing. The proposed mechanism is found to
be incentive-compatible 2, individually rational3 and weakly
budget-balanced4. A system of parallel DRS auctions was
proposed in [13] aiming to identify rider-driver matches that
minimise detours. A DRS model using mechanism design was
presented in [14], demonstrating that maximum social welfare
1Economically efficient auction allocations maximise social welfare.
2incentive-compatible mechanisms ensure that every participant is incen-
tivised to be truthful.
3Individual rationality ensures that no participant incurs a loss. [15]
4Weakly budget-balanced mechanisms ensure that auctioneer will not incur
a loss [14]
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2cannot be feasibly reached while incentivising the participation
of commuters and truthful reporting of trip reservation prices.
Lam [8] models the allocation of AV seats to customers
as a combinatorial auction, using the Vickrey-Clarkes-Grove
(VCG) mechanism to sequentially assign customers to vehicles
and determine prices. Three types of service are considered:
private rides, shared rides and requests split over multiple
vehicles. A separate study developed a CDA model for dial-a-
ride AV fleets [10] where multiple customers and AV operators
submit bids, while a platform determines allocations that
maximise social welfare. The model is applied for three types
of service as in [8], with prices computed using a relaxed
version of the problem with Lagrangian multipliers. The
algorithm is shown to be NP-hard, but optimal solutions can
still be obtained for realistic problem instances in reasonable
times. Another proposed technique [9], [16] involves a truthful
DRS mechanism based on a second-price auction with reserve
prices.
The majority of studies on ride-sharing auctions (Table
I) use two-dimensional models that perform one-to-one as-
signments between buyers and sellers. Nonetheless, DRS
outputs inherently consist of one-to-many assignments for
trips that contain at least three participants (one driver, two
riders), whose trip-time utilities are interdependent. This lim-
itation was partially addressed by previous studies [8], [10]
which, however, did not consider detour effects. An alternative
approach [9] utilised sequential rider-vehicle matches, but
without accounting for the effect of detours on valuations,
assignments and pricing estimates.
To address this literature gap, we develop a mathematical
model that considers the effects of shared-ride detours through
a winner determination process. This implements a sealed-bid
CDA, with simultaneous driver-rider assignments that seek to
maximise the total trade surplus. To reduce the problem search
space, we build upon the concept of shareability networks
[17], and transform the formulation into a Maximum Weighted
Independent Set Problem (MWIS), which is known to be APX-
hard.
Our contribution is summarised as follows:
1) We propose a WDP model for DRS assignment, imple-
menting a CDA while considering the effect of detours
on the valuations of auction participants.
2) We provide a local search algorithm which produces
near-optimal results in polynomial time.
3) We evaluate the effects of shill bidding on our proposed
CDA solutions and suggest methods to ensure the sta-
bility of the process.
The paper is structured as follows: Section II outlines
our proposed assignment and pricing methodology for shared
rides. An exact implementation of the model and an approx-
imate heuristic are described in section III alongside a case
study for a hypothetical TNC in New York. Findings and
recommendations for future work are provided in section IV.
II. METHODOLOGY
Our model assumes that travellers request shared rides
through a central TNC platform that operates its own vehicle
TABLE I: Auction studies on ride-sharing assignment
Study Problem Auction Assignment Detours
[7] DRS CDA one-to-one No
[13] DRS Vickrey one-to-one Yes
[14] DRS CDA one-to-one Yes
[8] DARP VCG one-to-many No
[10] DARP CDA one-to-many No
[9], [16] DARP VCG one-to-one Yes
fleet. Alongside origin/destination coordinates, travellers also
submit their trip valuations. Vehicles have a fixed per-minute
cost rate that is known in advance by the platform. The
objective of the model is to maximise the trade surplus, defined
as the sum of differences between traveller valuations and
vehicle costs.
Assignments are performed in intervals with duration ∆ -
given the larger pool of possible matches; this quasi-online
approach is expected to outperform a possible first-in-first-
out (FIFO) alternative ( [10], [17]). Two assignment types
are considered: the first is between riders willing to share a
trip (i.e. rider-rider), and the latter pertains to vehicles that
would like to offer trips (vehicle-riders). In both cases, the
algorithm seeks to identify potentially combinable requests,
therefore establishing shareability networks [17] that serve as
inputs to the CDA model alongside traveller trip valuations.
Any vehicles or travellers that are not matched by the CDA
are deferred to later model executions alongside any requests
that might have emerged in the meantime.
A. Pre-matching
The pre-matching stage is used to filter incompatible
vehicle-rider and rider-rider combinations before the execution
of the CDA, therefore reducing instance sizes without penal-
ising solution quality. Quality indices δw and δd are used to
reflect the maximum allowable rider wait time, and detours5
respectively. Let R represent a set of ride requests and K a
set of vehicles operated by the platform.
For each vehicle k ∈ K we seek to obtain a subset Nk ⊆ R
that the vehicle can access within a period with approximate
duration δw. Conversely, for each ride request r ∈ R, we seek
to identify a subset Ar ⊆ K that can be picked up within δw.
A ride request r is placed in Nk and a vehicle k is placed in
Ar according to Algorithm 1 if condition C0 (eq. (1)) is met,
where T (〈k, r〉) is the travel time from the current location of
vehicle k to the origin of request r, and T (c) is the execution
time of a stop sequence c.
C0 : T (〈k, r〉) ≤ δw (1)
In the case of rider-rider matching, we obtain the subset of
second requests Ir ⊆ R\r that can be matched with a request
r ∈ R and executed with a detour lasting δd or less. We also
obtain a subset of requests Jr ⊆ R \ r that can be matched
with r as the second rider in the vehicle, also with a detour
5Detours are defined as the additional in-vehicle time of a shared trip from
a private trip that a rider might experience.
3Algorithm 1 Prematching check: Vehicle-Rider
for k ∈ K do
for r ∈ R do
if C0 then
Nk ← Nk ∪ r
Ar ← Ar ∪ k
end if
end for
end for
of δd or less. As such, for every request pair i, j ∈ R, i 6= j
where i and j are the first and second rider, respectively, there
exists a set of origin-destination combinations 〈oi, oj , di, dj〉
and 〈oi, oj , dj , di〉. The following conditions apply:
C1 : T (〈oi, oj , di〉) ≤ Pi + δd (2)
C2 : T (〈oi, oj , di, dj〉) ≤ Pj + δd (3)
C3 : T (〈oi, oj , dj , di〉) ≤ Pi + δd (4)
C4 : T (〈oi, oj , dj〉) ≤ Pj + δd (5)
In eq. (2)-(5), Pr represents the travel time for a private
trip r ∈ R. Algorithm 2 is used to prematch rider pairs -
since these are obtained alongside vehicle-rider the complexity
of these operations is O(|R|2) [17]. The maximum possible
total detour and waiting time for any rider r ∈ R once the
assignment is confirmed is δw + δd due to pre-matching.
Algorithm 2 Prematching check: Rider-Rider
for i ∈ R do
for j ∈ R \ i do
if (C1 ∧ C2) ∨ (C3 ∧ C4) then
Ii ← Ii ∪ j
Jj ← Jj ∪ i
end if
end for
end for
The resulting adjacency subsets Nk, Ar, Ir and Jr can be
visualised using a network where nodes represent vehicles or
ride requests. A link from a vehicle k to rider r exists if r ∈ Nk
(and consequently k ∈ Ar), whereas a link between riders i
and j exists if j ∈ Ii (and consequently i ∈ Jj) or vice-
versa. Figures 1a and 1b illustrate the auction participants’
initial locations and the result of pre-matching respectively, in
a randomly generated problem instance of 20 vehicles and 40
riders in Manhattan, New York City.
B. Combinatorial Double Auction
Our auction model builds upon [10] by introducing a trading
good and applying a shareability network to reduce search
space. Furthermore, it takes into account the quality of shared
trips and the proximity of vehicles to achieve higher time
savings. As a result, riders would obtain different overall trip
valuations when matched to different passengers or vehicles,
while the pool of potential assignments would be further honed
(a) (b)
Fig. 1: Problem instance before (a) and after (b) pre-matching.
due to the use of a trip compatibility network. Without loss of
generality, we assume that individual trip requests only consist
of single riders. This assumption can be relaxed to extend the
model to cater for larger passenger groups.
We consider a set of riders R and a set of vehicles
K. Each rider r ∈ R is identified as a 6-element tuple
〈Fr, Cr, Pr, Ir, Jr, Ar〉, where Fr is the maximum reservation
price, Cr is the time valuation, Pr is an 1D array of vehicle
travel times required for a private trip (pick-up to drop-off),
while Ir, Jr and Ar are the adjacency subsets obtained through
pre-matching (Section II-A).
The 3D array Si,j,n represents the remaining vehicle travel
time for matched riders i and j, once the final passenger is
picked up, with the pick-up sequence in the order 〈oi, oj〉. We
use 3 dimensions for Si,j,n to account for i and j having
different remaining travel times once j is picked up. For
example, if i is dropped off first, the remaining time for i
might be T (〈oj , di〉), whereas the remaining time for j could
be T (〈oj , di, dj〉). At the same time, the remaining travel time
for the vehicle would be T (〈oj , di, dj〉). Using the procedure
described in Algorithm 2, we obtain the assignment with
the shortest total vehicle time. Finally, the index n can take
values between [1, 2, 3], denoting whether Si,j,n refers to the
first or final passenger to be picked up, or the vehicle itself,
respectively.
The array Wi,j is used to represent the vehicle travel time
from vehicle origins i to rider origins j, for i ∈ K ∪R, j ∈ R.
The binary decision variable xi,j ∈ {0, 1} is used to indicate
if a vehicle or request i is assigned by the action to request j,
such that i ∈ K ∪R, j ∈ R. Then let:
Tr,1 =
∑
i∈Ir
[
xr+|K|,i
(
Wr+|K|,i + Sr,i,1
)]
(6)
Tr,2 =
∑
i∈Jr
[
xi+|K|,r
(
Wi+|K|,r + Si,r,2
)]
(7)
denote the driving times from the pick-up to drop-off location
of the first and second passenger respectively. Similarly, let:
4Tr,3 =
∑
i∈Ir
[
xr+|K|,i
(
Wr+|K|,i + Sr,i,3
)]
(8)
be the driving time from the pick-up location of the first
passenger to the drop-off location of the last passenger. The
total service time tr of each request r is therefore defined as
follows:
tr =
∑
k∈Ar
[
xk,rWk,r + xk,rTr,1
]
+ Tr,2 (9)
Using the waiting and travel time from (9) we can define
the reservation price f(r) for rider r as follows:
f(r) = Fr − Crtr (10)
The utility ur of a rider with respect to request r is:
ur =
{
f(r)−∑k∈K pk,r(tr) if r can be served
0 otherwise
(11)
where pk,r(tr) in (11) is the corresponding service charge for
rider r when is assigned to vehicle k, as a function of the travel
time tr. Its value is determined by the platform and is equal to
zero if vehicle k is not assigned to request r. Each available
vehicle k ∈ K, is described as a 3-tuple 〈Bk, Qk, Nk〉; where
Bk is its marginal operational cost, Qk is its capacity before
assignment and Nk is a subset defining riders in its vicinity
(calculated as per Section II-A). We define the travel time dk
to serve a particular set of riders for vehicle k, from starting
to travel to the first rider until the delivery of the last rider as
follows:
dk =
∑
r∈Nk
[
xk,rWk,r + xk,rTr,3
]
(12)
Using eq. (12), we define the cost of serving the riders
assigned to each vehicle k as:
b(k) = Bkdk (13)
As such, the total utility for vehicle k when included in the
auction process is defined by:
µk =
{∑
r∈R pk,r(tr)− b(k), if k serves any ride
0, otherwise.
(14)
To identify the winners of the auction and the assignment of
vehicles to riders, we adopt a WDP methodology that simulta-
neously considers all rider bids and vehicle costs. To achieve
this, we modify the structure of the existing formulation to
ensure that utilities equal to zero if rider r cannot be served
or vehicle k is not assigned, for rider and vehicle utilities
respectively.
Since tr and dk both equal to zero if rider r or vehicle k
are not included in any assignments, the versions of the rider
utility ur and vehicle utility µk are transformed as follows:
ur = XrFr − Crtr −
∑
k∈K
pk,r(tr) (15)
µk =
∑
r∈R
pk,r(tr)− b(k) (16)
where the term Xr =
(∑
k∈Ar xk,r +
∑
i∈Ir xi+|K|,r
)
indicates whether rider r is in the auction either as a first
or as a second client. The model aims to maximise the total
utility of all the participants (vehicles and riders), with the
objective function defined as follows:
SW =
∑
r∈R
ur +
∑
k∈K
µk
=
∑
r∈R
(
XrFr − Crtr
)
−
∑
k∈K
b(k)
(17)
where SW indicates the value of social welfare. Observe
that the service charges cancel out in the summation of
the participants’ utilities. The optimisation problem is then
formulated with the following set of constraints:
Model 1 (Winner Determination Problem for Ride Sharing):
maximize SW (18a)
subject to
xk,r +
∑
i∈Ir
xr+|K|,i ≤ Qk, ∀k ∈ K,∀r ∈ Nk, (18b)∑
k∈Ar
xk,r +
∑
i∈Jr
xi+|K|,r ≤ 1, ∀r ∈ R, (18c)∑
k∈Ar
xk,r − 1 ≤M
(
1−
∑
i∈Ir
xr+|K|,i
)
,∀r ∈ R, (18d)
1−
∑
k∈Ar
xk,r ≤M
(
1−
∑
i∈Ir
xr+|K|,i
)
,∀r ∈ R, (18e)∑
r∈R
xi,r ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ K ∪R, (18f)∑
i∈K∪R
xi,r ≤ 1, ∀r ∈ R, (18g)∑
k∈Ar
xk,r −
∑
i∈Ir
xr+|K|,i = 0, ∀r ∈ R, (18h)
xi,j ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i, j ∈ K ∪R (18i)
Eq. (18b) ensures that the number of assigned riders to
each vehicle k is at most equal to the vehicle capacity Qk
if assigned with a rider r. (18c) guarantees that if rider r is
assigned, it is either the first rider or the second passenger to
board. Eqs. (18d) and (18e) utilize the Big M method [18] to
ensure that if any two riders are matched, the first rider r in
the matching has to be picked up by a vehicle k. M is defined
as a sufficiently large positive number.
Eq. (18f) ensures that each vehicle or rider is assigned
as a starting point towards a rider at most once. Eq. (18g)
ensures that each rider is assigned as a destination from a
vehicle location or a rider no more than once. Finally, eq.
(18h) ensures that if a vehicle is connected to a rider, there
would be an additional rider in the trip.
5Note that eqs. (9) and (12) feeding into the objective
function, include non-linear terms. We therefore introduce
variables yk,r ∈ R+ and zk,r ∈ R+, to replace the non-
linear terms in equations (9) and (12) respectively as shown
in equations (19) and (20).
tr =
∑
k∈Ar
(
xk,rWk,r + yk,r
)
+ Tr,2 (19)
dk =
∑
r∈Nk
(
xk,rWk,r + zk,r
)
(20)
Consequently the objective function in equation (17) trans-
forms into the following:
SWL =
∑
r∈R
ur +
∑
k∈K
µk
=
∑
r∈R
(
XrFr − Crtr
)
−
∑
k∈K
Bkdk
=
∑
r∈R
[
XrFr − Cr
[ ∑
k∈Ar
(
xk,rWk,r + yk,r
)
+ Tr,2
]]
−
∑
k∈K
Bk
[ ∑
r∈Nk
(
xk,rWk,r + zk,r
)]
(21)
where SWL denotes the value of the objective after lineariza-
tion. To ensure that the variable yk,r equals its desired value,
we introduce the following linearization constraints:
yk,r ≤Mxk,r (22)
yk,r ≤ Tr,1 (23)
yk,r ≥ Tr,1 −M(1− xk,r) (24)
yk,r ∈ R+ (25)
for every r ∈ R and every k ∈ Ar. In a similar fashion, we
introduce the following linearization constraints for variable
zk,r:
zk,r ≤Mxk,r (26)
zk,r ≤ Tr,3 (27)
zk,r ≥ Tr,3 −M(1− xk,r) (28)
zk,r ∈ R+ (29)
for every k ∈ K and every r ∈ Nk.
By incorporating the additional variables and constraints in
equations (19)-(29), our optimisation methodology for Model
1 transforms to the following Mixed Integer Linear Program
(MILP):
Model 2 (Transformed WDP for Ride Sharing)
maximize SWL
subject to (18b) - (18i),
(22) - (29)
C. Reduction to Maximum Weighted Independent Set
To assess the complexity of Model 2, we present a reduction
to the MWIS problem. We assume that in the largest instance,
all vehicles and requests are adjacent to each other. In other
words, all vehicles are compatible with all requests, and all
requests are sharing-compatible. In that scenario, with K and
R being the sets of vehicles and requests, respectively, we let
C denote the set of all possible combinations, where |C| =
|K||R|2 − |K||R|.
Assuming that all vehicles will be assigned, the set of all
path-vehicle allocations is
(|K||R|2−|K||R|
|K|
)
. To prove the APX-
hardness of Model 2, we use an approximation-preserving
reduction from MWIS.
Theorem 1. Model 2 is NP-Hard
Proof. We reduce an instance of MWIS, a known APX-hard6
problem [19], to an instance of Model 2. Given a weighted
graph G = (V,E,w), the MWIS objective is to find a set of
pairwise disjoint nodes S ⊆ V with maximum total weight.
Let the tuple (k, i, j) denote the ride-sharing trip of Model 2
with vehicle k in which the first passenger is i and the second
is j, ∀k ∈ K, i, j ∈ R and i 6= j. Also let ui(k, i, j) and
uj(k, i, j) denote the utilities of riders i and j respectively,
for the trip (k, i, j) and uk(k, i, j) denote the utility of the
vehicle.
Consider now the following representation; let G =
(V,E,w) be a graph where each vertex represents a combina-
tion c = (k, i, j). An edge exists between vertices cn and cm
if and only if the trip combinations cn and cm have a common
element, i.e. a common vehicle or rider. Let:
wc = uk(k, i, j) + ui(k, i, j) + uj(k, i, j) (30)
denote the weight of vertex c = (k, i, j). We note that
changing the order of two riders in a combination can result in
a different weight for the corresponding vertex. That is because
the detour or the wait time after the reordering can exceed
either of the thresholds δd, δw set by the passengers, thus
resulting in a different value of their utilities.
We now prove the correctness of the above transformation.
Let OPT (I ′) denote an optimal solution to a Model 2 instance
I ′. For any two trip combinations c, c′ that either have a com-
mon rider or vehicle, at most one of them will be in OPT (I ′)
and the vertices representing these trips will be connected by
an edge in graph G. As a result OPT (I ′) is represented by a
set of independent nodes in G and since the solution is optimal
with cost
∑
r∈R ur +
∑
k∈K µk =
∑
c∈V wc by equation (30)
this corresponds to an independent set of maximum weight in
G.
Conversely, suppose we have an optimal solution OPT (I)
on an instance I of MWIS in G. Since OPT (I) is inde-
pendent, no pair of nodes will be connected, so no pair
of trips from WDP will have a common element. Again
according to eq. (30), the total weight of the selected trips
is maximised.
6APX is the complexity class of optimization problems that cannot be
approximated within some constant factor unless P 6= NP
6We notice that the above reduction preserves the approx-
imation [19]. Let f be the (polynomial time) transformation
from an instance I ′ of Model 2 to an instance I of MWIS as
described above i.e. I = f(I ′) and let g be the (polynomial
time) algorithm that produces a solution to I given a solution
to I ′. Let also α = 1 and β = 1. Using transformation
f , the optima of I and I ′ satisfy the following inequality
OPT (I ′) ≤ αOPT (I). Furthermore, having a solution with
weight w′ for any instance I ′, we can construct a solution for
I with weight w such that |w−OPT (I)| ≤ β|w′−OPT (I ′)|
using algorithm g.
Corollary 1. Model 2 is APX-Hard.
Many greedy approximation algorithms have been previ-
ously proposed, with their approximation ratio expressed as
a polynomial in terms of the average or maximum node
degree in the graph [20]. We note that in the fully connected
scenario, the average/maximum degree of node c is ∆c =
|R|(|R| − 1)− 1 + (|K| − 1)(4|R| − 6). To demonstrate this,
if we consider a combination (k, i, j), there exist additional
|R|(|R| − 1)− 1 trip combinations with vehicle k. For every
other vehicle from the remaining |K|−1, there exist 2(|R|−1)
trip combinations including rider i and an additional 2(|R|−2)
including rider j, which are not already accounted. Thus,
simplifying (|K| − 1)(2(|R| − 1) + 2(|R| − 2)) results to
(|K| − 1)(4|R| − 6).
D. Local Search Algorithm using Greedy Search Initialisers
We established earlier that solving the MWIS problem for
a fully connected CDA scenario, would involve finding a
MWIS in graphs with |C| = |K||R|2 − |K||R| nodes with
an average/maximum node degree of ∆c = |R|(|R|−1)−1+
(|K| − 1)(4|R| − 6). Considering a small localised example
with 10 vehicles and 20 potential riders, that would generate
a network with 3800 nodes with an average/maximum node
degree of 1045.
An exact solution would, therefore, be impractical, as ex-
isting solution algorithms are slow even for a few hundreds of
vertices [21]. We propose a local search algorithm based on
simulated annealing (SA), a technique that has been shown to
perform very well for the maximum clique problem (a similar
premise, as it is the opposite of an independent set) [22].
Simulated Annealing (SA) was initially proposed as a
probabilistic method to solve difficult optimisation problems
[23]. It aims to bring a system from an arbitrary initial state
to an eventual state of minimum energy. Most SAs use an
energy measure that is inversely proportional to the quality
of the solution and is minimised using an iterative process.
Starting from a seed solution, SA iterations generate several
neighbouring solutions, which are accepted in accordance
with a stochastic process. The process continues until the
”temperature” of the problem reaches a user-defined minimum.
A high-level structure of our SA algorithm for the MWIS
problem is presented in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 utilizes a graph G, constructed to identify all
possible vehicle-rider-rider combinations by representing them
as a set of nodes. Each node in the set is a 3-tuple, 〈c, wc, Nc〉.
Algorithm 3 SA for the Independent Set Problem
Generate initial solution S0 for graph G
Set initial and minimum temperatures T0, Tmin
Sold = S0
Eold = energy(Sold, G)
Sbest = Sold
Ebest = Eold
T ← T0
while T > Tmin do
Snew = neighbour(Sold, G)
Enew = energy(Snew, G)
if Enew < Ebest then
Sbest = Snew
Ebest = Enew
end if
Sold, Eold = select(Sold, Snew, Eold, Enew, T )
T = αT , (where α is a constant and α < 1)
end while
Output: Sbest, Ebest
c refers to the combination of vehicle-rider-rider in the form
of 〈k, i, j〉, wc refers to the weight of the node as defined in
Section II-C and Nc is a list of neighbouring nodes. It can be
easily shown that the degree of each vertex is equal to |Nc|.
To construct the graph we set Nc = ∅ and iterate through
the network nodes to populate Nc for each vertex. As with
Algorithm 4, this process requires |K||R|2 iterations (fully
connected scenario) to create the set of vertices V . Populating
Nc for each vertex (and creating the edge set E), requires
|V |2 iterations (Algorithm 5). Since |V |2 = (|K||R|2)2, the
complexity of the worst case scenario for network generation
is O(|K|2|R|4). This process, however, can be easily paral-
lelised.
Algorithm 4 Vertex Generation Process
V ← ∅
for k ∈ K do
for i ∈ Nk do
for j ∈ Ii do
wc = ui(k, i, j) + ui(k, i, j) + uk(k, i, j)
if wc ≥ 0 then
c = 〈k, i, j〉
Nc = ∅
V ← V ∪ 〈c, wc, Nc〉
end if
end for
end for
end for
Output: V
A set of greedy heuristics [20] is used to obtain an initial so-
lution S0, consisting of an ordered set of vertices in V . These
operate by sorting vertices in a descending order with respect
to wc, 1/|Nc|, wc/|Nc| and wc/
∑
i∈Nc wi, respectively. The
best solution among these four is identified through inspection.
To calculate the energy of a solution (Algorithm 6), we
7Algorithm 5 Edge Generation Process
Non-empty set V
E ← ∅
for i ∈ V do
for j ∈ V \ i do
if ci ∩ cj 6= ∅ then
Nci ← Nci ∪ j
Ncj ← Ncj ∪ i
E ← 〈i, j〉
end if
end for
end for
Output: G = (V,E)
iterate through the ordered vertex sequence S. At each step,
we add the next vertex in S to the independent set I and
removing its neighbours from S. Iterations continue until S is
empty. The energy of the solution is, therefore, equal to the
negative sum of all values wc, for each vertex within I .
Algorithm 6 Energy Calculation
Non-empty ordered sequence S
Graph G = (V,E)
I ← ∅
while S 6= ∅ do
i = S(1)
I ← I ∪ i
S ← S \ (S ∩ (Nci ∪ i)), (obtain Nci from G)
end while
E = −∑i∈I wci , (obtain wci from G)
Output: E
When it comes to the generation of neighbouring solutions,
we randomly select two vertices in the independent set I of
the old solution Sold and switch their positions in Sold to
produce sequence Snew. This approach increases the chance
that sequence Snew will produce a different independent
set and energy than Sold. Finally, we form our stochastic
selection method on defining an acceptance probability for
every new solution, which is calculated using Eold, Enew and
temperature T as shown in Algorithm 7. Better solutions are
always accepted, whereas worse solutions have less chance of
being accepted as the iterations progress (i.e. as temperature
T decreases).
E. Trip Price Determination
Optimal solutions of the WDP in CDAs produce efficient
outcomes which are individually rational. That is, assuming
participants in the auction are truthful about their valuations.
There is, however, no guarantee that auction participants
(bidders) will state their true valuations. [15] explains this
problem with an example of three bidders. We will extend
this example to our CDA, to illustrate how untruthful bids can
arise.
Let us consider a CDA scenario involving three riders
(bidders) and one vehicle. Let us also assume that from the
Algorithm 7 Selection Process
Inputs: Sold, Snew, Eold, Enew, T
p = X , (where X ∼ U(0, 1))
if Enew < Eold then
pa = 1
else
pa = e
(Eold−Enew)/T
end if
if pa > p then
Sold = Snew
Eold = Enew
end if
Outputs: Sold, Eold
six possible allocation combinations, the following three yield
a positive value for total trade surplus:
f1(〈1, 2〉) = 10, f2(〈1, 2〉) = 8, b1(〈1, 2〉) = 10 (31)
f1(〈2, 1〉) = 7, f2(〈2, 1〉) = 9, b1(〈2, 1〉) = 11 (32)
f1(〈1, 3〉) = 5, f3(〈1, 3〉) = 10, b1(〈1, 3〉) = 12 (33)
In eqs. (31)-(33), fr(〈S〉) and bk(〈S〉) represent total valu-
ation and cost for a rider r and a vehicle k, respectively, for
a trip with a pickup sequence S. Using Model 2, the platform
allocates the trip with the only vehicle servicing riders 1 and
2 in the sequence 〈1, 2〉 as it is the combination producing
the highest trade surplus. Note that riders 1 and 2, assuming
everyone bids truthfully, can report a lower value per time and
still win the auction with the same combination.
The inclusion of additional riders will give rise to more
complex bidding strategies. In the case that riders 1 and 2
reduce their bids excessively, they might lose in the auction.
This characteristic CDA property is known as the thresh-
old problem [24] and refers to the implication of valuation
misreporting thresholds for individual participants, which can
motivate bidders to employ perverse bidding strategies [25].
Pricing in VCG auctions, where bidders pay the differ-
ence of welfare in their absence with the welfare of others
when they are included in the auction, is incentive-compatible
[15]. Furthermore, incentive-compatible payments have been
derived through the solution of dual relaxed linear problems
(LPs) of the WDP [26]. Previous studies [10], [27], [28],
used relaxed dual WDP problems to identify allocation and
pricing in double auctions, with Lagrangean multipliers to
be considered as prices. It has been shown that optimal dual
variables in LP coincide with VCG payments [29].
However, the use of near-optimal CDA solutions does not
preserve incentive compatibility [30]. Negligible variations
from the optimal objective can have significant consequences
on the payments to be made by bidders [31]. As such, an ap-
proximate WDP solution would inhibit the use of VCG or dual
LP relaxations that would guarantee incentive-compatibility.
8To identify the extent of the threshold problem, we investigate
the robustness of pricing riders on their valuations. We assume
that the platform classifies AV costs as per vehicle model and
therefore is always truthful.
III. DISCUSSION
Our assignment approach was implemented using Python
and tested on a workstation with an Intel i7-4790 CPU
(3.6GHz) and 8GB RAM. Exact solutions were obtained using
a Branch and Bound algorithm provided by the ECOS BB
package [32], with a maximum of 1000 iterations.
To test the algorithm, we create a case study network set
in Manhattan, NY. The underline road network and travel
times were obtained using the OSMnx library [33]. To account
for congestion, we applied a 20% penalty to the free-flow
speeds in residential and motorway link segments, and 40%
elsewhere. Rider origin-destination pairs, as well as vehicle
locations, were sampled uniformly in space to create CDA
instances. Only trips with travel time that is greater than 5
minutes were considered, while δw and δd were both set to 10
minutes each.
For this study, we used UK-based estimates of working time
valuations [34] for the derivation of rider valuations. Vehicles
were assumed to have a capacity of two customers, with their
operating costs Bk sampled from a log-normal distribution
with a mean value of 12.96 GBP/hour and σ = 0.02.
Conversely, customer time valuations Cr were sampled from
a log-normal distribution with a mean of 17.69 GBP/hour and
σ = 0.02.
The maximum reservation price Fr for each request was
derived using the following generalised cost equation as the
difference between a perceived market norm and the platform:
Fr = Pr E(Price) +Cr(Pr +E(Wait) +E(Detour)) (34)
where E(Price) is the expected price per minute for a shared
trip in a competing platform, lasting Pr minutes if private,
and assumed to have a value of 0.75 GBP/min. E(Wait) and
E(Detour) refer to the expected wait and detour times of
competitors, set to 5 and 15 minutes respectively.
Table II provides a performance comparison of the Simu-
lated Annealing (SA) and the Branch and Bound (BB) algo-
rithms for a range of instances. As can be seen in the table, the
BB approach only manages to close the optimality gap within
the predetermined number of iterations only for very small
instances (i.e. less than 12 riders). For instances where BB
is successfully applied, the SA approach identifies a solution
within 1% of the known optimum. Conversely, for instances
where the BB algorithm terminates before converging to an
optimum, the SA method can identify solutions that are up to
3%.
A visual comparison of the results obtained by the BB and
SA algorithms is provided in figures 2a and 2b, respectively,
for an instance involving 10 vehicles, 20 customers and two
edges per match outlines the similarities between solutions
obtained using the two approaches.
(a) (b)
Fig. 2: Visualisation of (a) BB and (b) SA solutions
A. Trade surplus implications
A large number of problem instances where considered,
with fleet sizes ranging between 3 and 40 vehicles, and a
customer base of 10 to 60 riders. Figures 3a and 3b illustrate
the relationship between problem sizes and algorithm run
times, which is found to be in polynomial time. From the range
of greedy heuristics that were considered for SA initialisation
described in section II-D, the weight-based approach was
found to yield the best results (Figure 4).
The relationship between the objective value (equation (21))
and problem sizes is found to follow an increasing concave
downward curve (Figure 5a), indicating that the problem size
increases at a higher rate than the solution value. Figure
5b illustrates that there exists a linear relationship between
objective values and the number of served requests, indicating
that the SA approach remains effective even at larger instances.
We define the trade surplus index (TSI) as the ratio of the
objective value and the number of assigned vehicles in each
instance. Figures 6a and 6b illustrate its relationship with the
fleet coverage index (FCI), defined as the ratio of vehicles
available against the number of vehicles required to serve all
requests. An interesting feature of our approach (as shown in
Figures 6a and 6b) is that the TSI is inversely proportional to
the FCI for values of the latter between 0 and 1, and remains
constant beyond that point.
This pattern can be explained by considering a scenario
with 1 vehicle and 10 riders. In this case, the node with the
highest weight will be the solution in the MWIS problem. The
addition of a new vehicle (with the same cost), assuming that
it is included in the MWIS solution, will lead to a reduction in
the average node weight. This trend will persist with further
increases in the size of the fleet, as riders with lower valuations
are accommodated and gradually reduce the overall TSI. As
such, once FCI > 1 the TSI will on average remain constant,
consistent with the notion of market equilibrium while supply
increases beyond current demand levels.
9TABLE II: Performance comparison of the SA and BB algorithms for a range of instances.
Total
vehicles
Total
riders
Serving
vehicles
Served
riders
BB
solution
BB
upper
bound
BB
runtime
[sec]
BB
iterations
SA
solution
SA
runtime
[sec]
4 8 3 6 60.84 60.89 1.85 83 60.84 0.004
8 8 3 6 68.23 68.29 21.28 905 68.23 0.006
5 10 4 8 79.81 79.88 4.42 230 79.81 0.004
10 10 4 8 102.84 113.05 41.74 1000 102.84 0.02
5 12 5 10 115.86 131.57 32.30 1000 115.86 0.03
6 12 4 8 93.56 93.64 19.05 386 93.56 0.005
12 12 5 10 90.41 114.76 70.80 1000 90.41 0.05
6 14 6 12 103.67 126.25 55.63 1000 103.67 0.03
7 14 6 12 122.58 154.63 53.86 1000 121.63 0.03
7 15 6 12 145.00 197.47 64.23 1000 145.00 0.07
8 16 7 14 153.49 202.96 71.98 1000 152.26 0.03
7 17 7 14 181.99 260.42 80.17 1000 184.64 0.08
9 18 8 16 183.95 263.27 101.30 1000 184.91 0.28
8 20 8 16 178.79 254.42 140.30 1000 177.69 0.28
10 20 9 18 198.71 288.87 138.93 1000 198.95 0.30
11 22 11 22 266.28 382.43 226.54 1000 263.35 0.77
12 24 12 24 252.42 368.07 209.19 1000 254.57 0.56
10 25 10 20 209.66 297.52 285.99 1000 211.02 0.82
14 28 13 26 257.08 391.85 310.36 1000 263.64 2.10
15 30 15 30 310.42 458.14 478.33 1000 314.4 3.39
(a) (b)
Fig. 3: Network creation time (a) and algorithm runtime (b) against node count.
Fig. 4: Performance comparison of greedy initialisers
B. Pricing robustness
To gain insights into the effects of the threshold problem
(section II-E) and its implications to the effectiveness of
our SA implementation, we examined a fixed CDA instance
(15 vehicles, 40 requests) with varying rider valuations. We
assumed that at most 30 requests are serviceable, while per
minute rider valuations Cr ranged between [0.0432, 1.474]7.
We introduce the variables Qr,1 (35) and Qr,2 (36) that
gauge the probability that a rider r will be assigned to the first
and second pickup spots, respectively. A combined estimate
Qr (37) is used to obtain the overall likelihood of a successful
CDA outcome for r. The variables α and β in equations
(35) and (36) are constants determined via calibration. The
parameter values for equations (35)-(37) are provided in table
III.
Qr,1 = |Ar||Ir|
[
αPr − β
(
Gr +Hr
)]
(35)
Qr,2 = A¯|Jr|
[
αPr − β
(∑
i∈RGr
|R| + Er
)]
(36)
Qr =
Qr,1 +Qr,2∑
r∈R
(
|Ar||Ir|+ A¯|Jr|
) (37)
7The lower bound was calculated using the average cost per hour such that
0.0432× 60 = 12.96/5. The upper bound was calculated using the average
valuation per hour such that 1.474× 60 = 17.69× 5.
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(a) (b)
Fig. 5: Relationship between objective value and (a) problem size, (b) served requests
(a) (b)
Fig. 6: Trade surplus per served vehicle and (a) fleet coverage, (b) fleet coverage and node numbers
In the above, the terms A¯, Gr, Hr and Er are obtained
using equations (38)-(41):
A¯ =
∑
r∈RAr
|R| (38)
Gr =
∑
k∈Ar Wk,r
|Ar| (39)
Hr =
∑
i∈Ir Wr+|K|,i
|Ir| (40)
Er =
∑
i∈Jr Wi+|K|,r
|Jr| (41)
Equation (38) denotes the average number of neighboring
vehicles for all requests A¯, while in (39), Gr is the average
wait time for request r if picked up first. Hr in (40) is the
average time to the subsequent request for request r if picked
up first. Conversely, Er in (41) is the average wait time for
request r when picked up as the second passenger.
For each rider we consider the number of successful CDA
bids, as well as their wait and the duration of any detours.
From a total of 30 trial valuations per rider, we calculate the
proportion of successful bids Sr, which as shown in Figure
7a, exhibits a moderate correlation with Qr, with a Pearson
coefficient 0.5186.
This suggests that factors other than rider valuations also
play a role in determining auction winners. To establish this,
we proceed by equating α and β with 0.75 + Cr and Cr
respectively in equations (36) and (37) to best emulate the
rider utility in equation (10), factored by the estimated volume
of combinable trips for each rider. To assist our analysis we
introduce the term of customer inconvenience Lr as the sum of
wait and detour time for each rider r. We then refer to fairness
as the notion of decreasing inconvenience with increasing bid
valuation.
To determine the fairness of the auction over a range of
Cr values, we perform a regression analysis between Qr(Cr)
and the inconvenience values Lr for each rider. Figure 7b,
outlines the distribution of the correlation coefficients between
the modified quality metric Qr(Cr) and inconvenience Lr for
all riders.
In observing the results in 7b, we can deduce our proposed
local search algorithm is capable of identifying acceptable
solutions to the CDA, with a negative correlation between
the values of Qr(Cr) and Lr for most riders. As expected,
riders with higher bids are more likely to secure a trip in the
solution and are also likely to gain in time savings. However,
due to the spatiotemporal structure of the model, the notion of
fairness is not the same for each rider. Furthermore, given that
our local search algorithm provides an approximate solution,
some irregularities in allocations are expected when compared
to the optimal solution. We note that incremental increases in
rider valuations do not result in incremental improvement in
inconvenience, which reflects the combinatorial nature of the
model.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered the problem of ride-sharing
assignment and pricing in TNC platforms with autonomous
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TABLE III: Input parameters for quality metric Qr.
ID Pr |Ar| |Ir| |Jr| Gr Hr Er ID Pr |Ar| |Ir| |Jr| Gr Hr Er
1 23.9 2 8 4 6.23 5.43 1.77 21 6.5 8 3 7 6.07 6.9 7.8
2 25.31 2 7 4 6.27 5.47 1.49 22 18.67 9 14 15 5.17 4.15 4.16
3 24.26 3 8 5 6.92 4.91 2.67 23 12.66 9 10 14 5.56 4.3 4.94
4 8.89 3 5 4 7.3 3.26 1.55 24 10.37 9 6 11 5.28 6.17 6.5
5 12.64 4 5 5 5.78 5.74 5.09 25 6.56 9 17 12 6.67 5.22 5.38
6 24.55 4 9 3 8.45 5.48 6.04 26 10.95 9 8 9 5.71 4.34 3.72
7 20.7 4 8 6 6.18 5.8 4.84 27 7.93 9 10 7 6.56 5.04 4.86
8 16.82 4 5 5 4.88 4.96 7.05 28 9.12 9 4 6 5.14 3.01 4.3
9 12.43 5 8 7 5 5.83 5.82 29 5.31 9 8 7 5.21 2.99 3.57
10 13.16 6 5 10 5.93 6.87 6.62 30 6.08 9 6 13 6.64 4.76 6.96
11 14.15 6 6 2 7 5.84 3.24 31 7.74 10 7 5 5.63 3.79 3.88
12 18.44 6 12 7 5.07 6.61 5.57 32 8.26 10 11 12 5.96 4.4 4.79
13 12.2 6 5 3 6.18 5.32 4.25 33 11.55 10 10 14 6.57 4.66 5.11
14 11.67 6 5 9 5.29 6.23 6.54 34 8.46 10 7 12 5.76 3.38 5.01
15 21.13 7 13 10 5.44 5.82 4.61 35 6.11 10 5 8 6.47 3.01 4.6
16 19.6 7 9 6 6.22 6.41 5.14 36 11.05 10 10 14 5.81 3.97 4.54
17 13.82 7 10 7 5.86 6.35 5.14 37 10.03 10 12 10 6.04 4.52 4.09
18 17.15 8 7 6 6.08 5.88 5.8 38 18.72 10 6 9 6.14 4.11 4.12
19 11.85 8 0 2 5.77 0 8.94 39 10.59 10 10 11 7.54 4.5 5.69
20 6.3 8 7 5 6.03 4.8 5.16 40 15.04 10 11 11 7.44 5.05 4.66
(a) (b)
Fig. 7: Linear regression of quality measure Qr with success proportion Sr (a) and distribution of correlation coefficients
between Qr(Cr) and Lr (b).
vehicles. Our proposed dynamic assignment and pricing ap-
proach utilises a local search algorithm that solves a WDP
MILP variant near optimally in polynomial time by computing
3-dimensional assignments to maximise trade surplus. By in-
vestigating the robustness of our proposed pricing mechanism
we concluded that riders, increase their chances of winning the
auction by increasing their bid values and are also likely to
achieve results with improved wait and detour times in doing
so. These effects, however, are restricted by the combinatorial
reach of each rider in the auction.
Our suggestions for future research in this area are twofold.
First, we believe that both computational complexity and ac-
curacy improvements are possible in exploring the breadth of
meta-heuristics and machine learning algorithms in solving the
proposed problem of ride-sharing auctions. Spatial clustering
of requests, for example, could split much larger instances
than the ones tested into parallel problems, which could be
solved in a reasonable time, without compromising much of
the efficiency of the algorithm. Secondly, studies which focus
on analysing large data-sets of solutions for our proposed
algorithm (or a variant of it), could aid in structuring a ride-
sharing auction which is based on reasonable bid suggestions
provided by the TNC to the riders. The former system of
bid suggestions by TNCs could address the threshold problem
in combinatorial auctions and provide a stable combinatorial
auction system to be used in practice.
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